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The aim of this paper is to increase external auditors’ knowledge about earnings management and help 
them spot the difference between earnings management and financial reporting fraud. A thorough 
literature review was undertaken to achieve the paper’s aim. The secondary data used in this paper was 
obtained from different databases like Ebscohost, Business Search Premier, Academic Search Premier, 
Emerlad, Sciencedirect, and Jstor. The current paper suggests a new approach and way of thinking for 
external auditors that might help them in spotting the difference between earnings management and 
fraud. This new approach calls for the importance of considering management’s motives which is the 
main driver for all fraudulent activities. A set of recommendations for external auditors, researchers, and 
standards’ setters are provided in this paper. External auditors have to view external auditing in terms of 
the audit of motivations. Standards’ setters should provide external auditors with more guidelines 
regarding the audit of management’s motives. More research is still needed in management’s motives 
and integrity. 
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Introduction 
There is a debate in the audit literature on what 
should be considered as fraud or in other words, is 
earnings management another form of fraud. 
Reviewing the literature showed mixed results 
regarding whether earnings management is an ethical 
act. Some researchers (Subramanyam, 1996; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen, 1990; Demski, 1998; 
Glover & Sunder, 2003 as cited in Jiraporn, et al., 
2007; Peasnell, et al., 2001, as cited in Abdul 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Davis-Friday and Frecka, 
2002; Diana & Madalina, 2007; Jiraporn, et al., 2007) 
argue that there is nothing wrong with earnings 
management because it is within the boundaries of 
GAAP, while others (Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Public 
Oversight Board, 2000; Rosner, 2003; Abdul 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Jones, 2011; Hasnan, et al., 
2008; Jiraporn, et al., 2007; Kamel & Elbanna,2010; 
Perols & Lougee, 2010; Beneish, 2001; Higson, 
2003; Chia, et al., 2007; Jones, 2011) believe 
earnings management is not just an unethical act but 
another form of financial reporting fraud. By and 
large the debate on earnings management and fraud 
will continue unless there is a proper way to help 
auditors identify the difference between them. 
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This paper proposes a new approach and way of 
thinking that might help external auditors spot the 
difference between earnings management and 
financial reporting fraud. This new approach calls for 
the importance of auditing management’s motives 
and viewing auditing as the audit of motivations. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Defining Fraud and Earnings Management 
 
There are various definitions of fraud in the audit 
literature however they all have common facts about 
fraud. For instance, Wells (2009) mentioned that four 
elements must exist in any fraud case: A material 
false statement, intent to deceive, reliance on the 
false statement by the victim, and damages as a 
result. Lord added that different countries define 
fraud by using a common set of three elements: 
‘Material false statement with the intent to deceive, a 
proof that the victim depended on the false statement, 
and damages occurred as a result of victim’s reliance 
on those false statements’ (2010, p.5). In fact, in each 
country, the definition of fraud will be slightly 
different; but all definitions will involve that fraud is 
breaking the law or violating the regulatory 
framework (Jones, 2011). Fraud can generally be 
defined as an intentional and illegal act carried out by 
the perpetrator to steal or misuse the victim 
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organization’s resources or assets and the perpetrator 
can hide his theft by concealing the true nature of the 
business transaction. Fraud can be undertaken for the 
organization (Example: Tax fraud) or against the 
organization (Example: Misappropriation of assets or 
financial reporting fraud), and can be done by people 
inside (Example: Management or employees) or 
outside the organization (Vendors or customers) 
(Johnson & Rudesill, 2001; Alleyne & Howard, 
2005). Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 (SAS 
No.99) defines fraud as “an intentional act that results 
in a material misstatement in financial statements that 
are the subject of an audit” (Auditing Standards 
Board, 2002). O’Gara (2004) saw fraud 
encompassing an array of irregularities and illegal 
acts characterized by intentional deception and can be 
perpetrated for the benefit of the organization and by 
persons outside as well as inside the organization. 
Further, Wells defined occupational fraud as “The 
use of one's occupation for personal enrichment 
through the deliberate misuse or application of the 
employing organization's resources or assets” (2005, 
p.5). Fraud can also be defined as “the intentional 
distortion of financial statements or other records by 
persons internal or external to the authority, carried 
out to conceal the misappropriation of assets or 
otherwise for gain” (Salehi & Mansoury, 2009, p.7). 
Jones (2011, p.7) defined fraud as ‘the use of 
fictitious accounting transactions or those prohibited 
by Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP)’. 
Stolowy and Breton (2003) however, stated that 
fraud differs from earnings management. Fraud is 
outside the limits of GAAP and occurs when 
somebody commits an illegal act. However, earnings 
management is within GAAP and is one form of 
accounts manipulation. They defined accounts 
manipulation as:  The use of management’s 
discretion to make accounting choices or to design 
transactions so as to affect the possibilities of wealth 
transfer between the company and society fund 
providers or managers (2003, p.20).Earnings 
management is the process of taking deliberate 
actions within the constraints of GAAP so as to 
achieve a desired level of reported earnings 
(Koumanakos, et al., 2005; Guan, et al., 2006). 
Earnings management as Jones (2011) mentioned, 
involves using the flexibility within accounting to 
manage the accounts in order to deliver a 
predetermined profit or achieve a specific objective. 
 
Earnings management versus fraud: Evidence from 
Prior Literature 
 
Some researchers believe that earnings management 
is not a fraudulent act but an ethical and legal 
practice that enhances the value of information 
provided to users of financial statements. For 
instance, Subramanyam (1996); Watts & 
Zimmerman, (1986); Holthausen, (1990); Demski, 
(1998); Glover & Sunder, (2003) as cited in Jiraporn 
et al., 2007) believe earnings management is 
beneficial because it potentially enhances the 
information value of earnings. Earnings management 
activity by managers was viewed as beneficial to 
shareholders, especially where accounting discretion 
is used in improving in-formativeness of reported 
earnings (Peasnell, et al., 2001). Earnings 
management is also seen as something legal and 
ethical as mentioned by Davis-Friday and Frecka 
(2002). In a research carried out by Hunton, et al., 
(2004) results showed that earnings management in 
less transparent disclosure regimes will improve 
stock price and not harm the reputation for reporting 
integrity, while in more transparent disclosure 
regimes, earnings management will harm both stock 
price and reputation for reporting integrity.  
In addition, Diana and Madalina (2007) 
mentioned that manipulation is not fraud, it is a 
matter of interpretation. Jiraporn, et al., (2007) also 
found that earnings management does not appear to 
provide private benefits to management and is not 
detrimental to firm value. Others, however, believe 
that earnings management is just another form of 
fraud and has to be stopped. For example, Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) mentioned that: Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgment in 
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to 
alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported 
accounting numbers (1999, p.368). 
The Public Oversight Board (2000) noted that 
the term earnings management covers a wide variety 
of legitimate and illegitimate actions by management 
that affect an entity’s earnings. Illegitimate actions 
may involve intentionally recognizing or measuring 
transactions and other events and circumstances in 
the wrong accounting period or recording fictitious 
transactions which both constitute fraud. Rosner 
(2003) stated there is a fine line between earnings 
management and fraud. It has also been noted by 
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) and Jones (2011) that 
even if earnings management did not violate 
accounting standards, it may still lead to inaccurate 
information about the company, which will in turn 
mislead investors in judging the performance of the 
company. In a research carried out by Hasnan, et al. 
(2008) their findings revealed that earnings 
management has a positive and significant 
relationship with financial reporting fraud. Further, 
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Jiraporn, et al., (2009) mentioned that the recent 
scandals at Enron, WorldCom and elsewhere have 
generated a public perception that earnings 
management is utilized opportunistically by firm 
managers for their own private benefits rather than 
for the benefits of the stockholders. In their research 
about the quality of reported earnings in Egypt, 
Kamel and Elbanna (2010) found an agreement 
among respondents on the importance of combating 
earnings management in Egypt. Besides, Perols and 
Lougee (2010) found that the likelihood of fraud is 
significantly higher for firms that have previously 
managed earnings even when there is no evidence of 
inflated revenue and when they do not meet or beat 
analyst forecasts. In fact the debate on earnings 
management and fraud will continue unless there is a 
proper way to help auditors identify the difference 
between them. There is no consensus on what is 
earnings management and this shows the difficulty 
that auditors may face in detecting earnings 
management or researchers may face in determining 
earnings management incentives (Beneish, 2001).  
It is claimed that the only difference between 
earnings management and fraud is the compliance 
with standards. However, Shah (1996) believed 
compliance with standards is not an assurance that 
financial statements fairly present the financial 
situation of the firm. The Public Oversight Board 
(2000) mentioned that: “Determining whether or 
when the behaviour in the earnings management 
continuum crosses the line from legitimacy to fraud 
in a specific situation is not always easy and that at 
some point in the continuum, the motivation behind 
earnings management may become strong enough to 
result in fraud” (p. 79). Higson (2003) suggested the 
only way to differentiate between fraudulent and 
legitimate action is via understanding the motives 
behind each because this will help in determining 
whether the act was deliberate or accidental. Chia, et 
al., (2007, p.180) argued that “the direction of 
earnings management, insofar as it affects reported 
earnings, is dependent upon the incentives available 
to the managers”. In a research carried out by Kamel 
and Elbanna (2010) in Egypt, results showed that the 
engagement in earnings manipulation depends on 
three factors: The existence of motivations and 
pressures to engage in financial statement fraud, the 
availability of earnings management techniques, and 
the presence of weak corporate governance which 
encourages the practice of earnings manipulation.  
Besides, Jones (2011) mentioned that sometimes, 
managers start with creative accounting but if it fails 
to achieve the desired accounting figures, the creative 
accounting can turn into fraud. Thus, it can be 
concluded from the above studies that by 
understanding managements’ motives behind fraud 
and earnings management, auditors can highlight the 
differences between them, if there is any, and can 
spot fraudulent acts by tracking the way managers 
behave to reach their goals/intentions.  
 
Conclusion 
The current paper aims to increase external auditors’ 
knowledge about earnings management and help 
them spot the difference between earnings 
management and financial reporting fraud. 
Reviewing the literature showed mixed results 
regarding whether earnings management is an ethical 
act. Some researchers believe it is a legal act and 
totally different from fraud because it is within the 
boundaries of GAAP, while others see a very tiny 
line between earnings management and fraud, and 
view it as an unethical act that needs to be fought by 
external auditors. The debate on earnings 
management and fraud will continue unless there is a 
proper way to help auditors identify the difference 
between them. There is no consensus on what is 
earnings management and this shows the difficulty 
that auditors may face in detecting earnings 
management or researchers may face in determining 
earnings management incentives. Hence, the current 
paper suggests a new approach and a way of thinking 
for external auditors that might help them in spotting 
the difference between earnings management and 
fraud. This new approach calls for the importance of 
considering management’s motives which is the main 
driver for all fraudulent acts.  
Few researchers (Higson, 2003; Chia, et al., 
2007; Kamel & Elbanna, 2010; Jones, 2011) 
supported this view. They believed the only way to 
differentiate between fraudulent and legitimate action 
is via understanding the motives behind each because 
this will help in determining whether the act was 
deliberate or accidental. Hence, by understanding 
managements’ motives behind fraud and earnings 
management, auditors can highlight the differences 
between them, and can spot fraudulent acts by 
tracking the way managers behave to reach their 
goals/intentions. Based on the above conclusion, the 
current paper recommends that external auditors 
should view auditing as the audit of motivation 
because motives can help them spot the difference 
between fraudulent and non-fraudulent acts. At the 
same time regulators should provide external auditors 
with more guidance to audit these motives and they 
should rethink about the responsibility of external 
auditors toward earnings management. On the other 
hand, more research studies on motives, 
management’s integrity and how to detect earnings 
management are still needed. 
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